How Did Muslim Brotherhood Trick the Arab Coalition in the Storm of Determination?

Written by:
Dr. Hussain Laqur Ben Aidan – Southern Politician
[su_dropcap]A[/su_dropcap]t the beginning, Muslim Brotherhood didn’t take any clear position from the Strom of Determination as their delegate in Sanaa, Ben Omar, continued negotiations with Al-Houthis.
Two weeks after the war broke, they escaped from Sanaa and declared their support to the Coalition.
They started their first lie with the formation of the so-called Public Resistance. They benefited from that through arming terrorist groups, supporting and legitimizing them. we didn’t hear of resistance in Sanaa, Zemar or Al-Hodeida as they chose the edges and some southern areas. For two years, they lied about public resistance and didn’t liberate a single Yemeni governorate.
The second lie was the reconstruction of the national army. It was a big lie as they turned it from an army into a militia. Wives, sons and daughters had their special places in that army and party lists. They got their salaries while being in far countries including Turkey, Malaysia and Jordan.
This would never bother us if we saw, even for once, troops of the public resistance or the national army marching towards Sanaa. If we saw that we would say they know what they do. But after four years of war with all these crises we should consider reevaluating the position of the legitimacy who proved for years that they are not interested in either achieving victory over Al-Houthis or ending this war.

Dr. Hussain Laqur Ben Aidan – Southern Politician
At the beginning, Muslim Brotherhood didn’t take any clear position from the Strom of Determination as their delegate in Sanaa, Ben Omar, continued negotiations with Al-Houthis.
Two weeks after the war broke, they escaped from Sanaa and declared their support to the Coalition.
They started their first lie with the formation of the so-called Public Resistance. They benefited from that through arming terrorist groups, supporting and legitimizing them. we didn’t hear of resistance in Sanaa, Zemar or Al-Hodeida as they chose the edges and some southern areas. For two years, they lied about public resistance and didn’t liberate a single Yemeni governorate.
The second lie was the reconstruction of the national army. It was a big lie as they turned it from an army into a militia. Wives, sons and daughters had their special places in that army and party lists. They got their salaries while being in far countries including Turkey, Malaysia and Jordan.
This would never bother us if we saw, even for once, troops of the public resistance or the national army marching towards Sanaa. If we saw that we would say they know what they do. But after four years of war with all these crises we should consider reevaluating the position of the legitimacy who proved for years that they are not interested in either achieving victory over Al-Houthis or ending this war.